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Climate-Change Migration in the Pacific
John R Campbell
There is considerable debate about the links between environmental 
change (particularly degradation) and migration. This is no more so than 
in the case of climate change and population mobility. While the distinc-
tion is not a cut and dried one, there tends to be a division between two 
schools of thought. First, some working in the area of climate-change 
impacts foresee large numbers of people being forced to move as a result 
of rising sea levels, increases in the magnitude and/or frequency of cli-
mate-related extreme events, and other forms of environmental degrada-
tion caused by global warming. These observers, who tend to see migra-
tion in a negative light, have estimated that very large numbers of people 
globally will become “environmental refugees” or be displaced by the 
effects of climate change. For example, Norman Myers’s suggestion that 
there may be as many as two hundred million environmental refugees by 
the time “global warming takes hold” (perhaps around mid-twenty-first 
century) has gained considerable acceptance (Myers 2005). Several envi-
ronmental organizations and a number of aid groups consider that the 
numbers of environmental migrants may well exceed Myers’s estimates; 
for example, Christian Aid has suggested that the number of people dis-
placed by  climate change may exceed one billion (2007). 
In comparison, many social scientists, particularly migration scholars, 
are loath to attribute a significant role to environmental drivers of migra-
tion decision making and in any case see migration as a positive outcome 
(Barnett and Webber 2010; Tacoli 2009). One of the major arguments 
is that there is little empirical evidence to support claims of very large 
migration flows resulting from climate change. The problem is that there 
cannot possibly be much empirical evidence to support arguments for 
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or against climate-change migration (as opposed to climate migration) 
either because it is only just at its onset (see, eg, Warner and others 2009) 
or has yet to begin (at least in significant numbers) or because we can-
not attribute to climate change any individual climatic events that might 
currently be leading to migration. Most research is based on historical 
analogues, which are usually responses to extreme events and based on 
relatively stable long-term baseline environmental conditions that even-
tually return to some kind of “norm,” enabling return migration and 
reestablishment of communities. This is not likely to be the case with 
climate change, which largely includes variability around a changing 
mean, or increasing magnitude and/or frequency of extremes, through 
time. Returns to “normalcy” enabling return migration may simply not 
happen, or they may become fewer and further between. We have very 
few if any analogues for such conditions. Oli Brown examined differ-
ent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) scenarios and 
distinguished between an increase of between 5 and 10 percent in migra-
tion along existing pathways under the least disruptive scenario (b1) to 
the displacement of over two hundred million people under the worst 
scenario (a1f1—an intensive fossil fuel–based future) (Brown 2008). 
To date, other than pointing out that climate change may bring about 
changes in migration, the ipcc itself has not sought to quantify the likely 
numbers.1 
Much of the work on climate change and migration has tended to ema-
nate from Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America, and most authors 
take a pro-migration stance, perhaps partly as a response to xenophobic 
popular and political views of migration and fears of being “swamped” 
by climate-change refugees. Moreover, much of their work has focused 
on sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, with very little reference to small 
islands. Despite this, many popular and political discussions of climate-
change migration refer to small islands and atolls as being likely origins 
of displaced persons, and Pacific Island Countries and Territories (picts) 
are often identified as being among the most vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change and the origin of the “first climate change refugees” (see, 
eg, Morton 2009). Despite this, relatively little research has been done on 
the possible migration processes for picts that may be initiated by climate 
change, let alone their likely outcomes. Notwithstanding the large uncer-
tainties, particularly in the ways that climate change might be manifested, 
in this article I canvass the possible migration and relocation outcomes of 
climate change in picts.
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Climate Change in Pacific Island Countries  
and Territories: Effects and Responses
The processes of climate change and their effects in the region are likely 
to have serious implications for picts, and communities and governments 
will have to find ways of responding to them. Climate-change projections 
for picts are compromised by the small size of islands in relation to the 
coarse grids used in the models common in climate-change research. The 
ipcc, in its Fourth Assessment Report (Mimura and others 2007), indi-
cated that freshwater supplies of small islands are likely to be stressed by 
increased exposure to droughts, a possible increase in tropical cyclone 
intensity, increases in the severity and frequency of intense rainfall events, 
and problems associated with sea-level rise. A more recent study has been 
conducted as part of the Pacific Climate Change Science Program (abm and 
csiro 2011). This study, unlike the ipcc, suggests that drought events may 
not be so frequent and that tropical cyclones may become less frequent. It 
points to increasing ocean acidification and sea-level rise (projected to rise 
by around eighty centimeters by 2100) as having serious implications for 
coastal ecosystems. Considerable uncertainty remains about the physical 
manifestations of climate change in Oceania. Generally, five main areas 
have been identified in which the effects of climate change may have seri-
ous implications: (1) coastal effects of sea-level rise (including erosion and 
inundation); (2) reduced quantity or quality of water resources; (3) coral 
reef degradation; (4) reduced agricultural productivity; and (5) impacts 
on human health (eg, changing disease vectors, heat-related diseases, and 
water-borne diseases).
It is also important to take into account the considerable variability in 
the physical environments of Pacific Islands. Large islands built along the 
boundaries between oceanic and continental tectonic plates in the west-
ern Pacific, often referred to as “continental” or plate-boundary islands, 
have high elevations, well-developed hydrological systems, and relatively 
high levels of biodiversity. Islands lying to the east of the plate boundar-
ies are referred to as oceanic islands. These include volcanic high islands, 
built over “hot spots” in the earth’s mantle, which exist in various states, 
subsiding as they move away from the hot spots through the movement 
of the oceanic plate and through erosion as they are exposed to the ele-
ments over time. These islands are characterized by porous soils, poorly 
developed river systems, and fringing and barrier reefs. Atolls are islands 
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built on coral reefs that have grown on submerged volcanic high islands. 
Typically, they are extremely low lying, usually only a few meters above 
sea level, with no soils, no surface water, very low levels of terrestrial 
biodiversity, and relatively fragile groundwater systems. Some atolls have 
become stranded above sea level and are often referred to as raised lime-
stone islands. Considerable variation also exists within each of these cat-
egories. Accordingly, the effects of climate change are likely to be variable 
across the region.
Two broad categories of human responses to climate change are now 
used in most climate-change discourse: mitigation and adaptation.2 Mitiga-
tion refers to activities that seek to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases 
(ghgs) into the troposphere. picts generally have very low rates of ghg 
emissions (Barnett and Campbell 2010), even on a per capita basis, and 
can do little themselves to slow down the rates of increasing concentrations 
of tropospheric greenhouse gases. There are, however, regional programs 
to promote renewable energy (spc 2010; sprep 2012), and some countries 
are establishing policies to reduce emissions related to deforestation (see, 
eg, Fiji Forestry Department 2011). From the pict perspective, their most 
important weapon for reducing ghg emissions is moral suasion, which to 
date has had little political leverage despite the efforts of the countries them-
selves and of the Alliance of Small Island States (aosis), an international 
umbrella organization. The weak commitments included in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol and the failure of developed countries to meet even these and to reach 
agreement on a second commitment period indicate a considerable lack of 
political will among a number of heavy greenhouse gas emitters. 
Given the inability of the international regime to significantly reduce 
greenhouse gas concentrations, adaptation has become an increasingly 
urgent response option. Generally, adaptation refers to measures that 
enable communities to cope with, and where possible benefit from, the 
effects of global warming.3 In the Pacific region, the benefits are difficult to 
project, but there are likely to be a considerable number of adverse effects 
on the security of pict communities. The effects of climate change are 
likely to influence island environments as sites of human settlement (their 
“life-support systems”) in three ways. First, some of these effects may have 
impacts on land security, which is the physical presence of land on which 
to live and sustain livelihoods. Second, they may impinge on the livelihood 
security (especially food security) of island communities where the produc-
tivity of subsistence and commercial activities may be reduced; in extreme 
cases, the loss of productivity may be severe. Third, the effects of climate 
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change on small-island environments may result in declining habitat secu-
rity, in which, despite the existence of land and livelihoods, other factors 
such as declining health bring about reductions in community well-being. 
Table 1 shows the five sets of climate-change effects on islands, together 
with their implications for land, livelihood, and habitat security. 
Table 1.  The Main Effects of Climate Change on picts and Implications 
for Community Security
 Main Effects Implications
Sea-Level Rise:
????????????? Land security in coastal and atoll locations may
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????  livelihood security through loss of agricultural land 
and salinization of soils, plants, and water supplies.
Water Resources:
??????????????????????? Livelihood security may be affected by decreased
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????habitat security may
magnitude of droughts   be adversely affected by water borne diseases.
??????????????????????????????? 
of water resources
??????????????
Coral Reefs:
???????????????????????????????? Livelihood security may be compromised by
of increased sea surface    reductions in fisheries and other marine resources 
temperatures and increased    dependent on healthy coral environments. Land
ocean acidity    security may be reduced by increased exposure 
to high waves and storm surges.
Agriculture:
??? ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
of processes including temper-   on livelihood security and, where extremely severe, 
ature rise, reduced water    may render some locations uninhabitable 
availability, salinization, and    (habitat security).
exposure to tropical cyclones 
(wind, rain, and wave damage)
Human Health:
??? ?????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? 
as malaria and dengue   habitat security of island settlement locations 
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? 
borne diseases   uninhabitable.
?????????????????????????????? 
related diseases
??????? After Campbell and Bedford 2013.
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Where are these effects on island life-support systems most likely to be 
manifested? First, some atoll communities may lose land security through 
erosion and inundation and may lose livelihood and habitat security as a 
result of reduced quantity and quality of water supplies and loss of food 
production. Key concerns here are the rate and magnitude of sea-level 
rise and changes in drought occurrence, intensity, and duration. Atolls in 
tropical cyclone–prone areas may experience events of greater intensity 
in the future. Second, coastal locations may similarly become uninhabit-
able. With the exception of some of the larger Melanesian islands, the 
great majority of settlements in the region, including all but a few towns 
and cities, are near sea level. There are already many examples of com-
munities relocating following repeated or major tropical cyclones, and 
this trend may increase if climate scenarios of sea-level rise and tropical 
cyclone intensity eventuate (Campbell and others 2007). Third, commu-
nities located in river deltas may be particularly prone to river flooding 
and sea-level rise, which may lead to the erosion and/or inundation of 
settlements and agricultural land. Deltas may be affected by sea-level rise, 
and when there is river flooding and storm surge, they are likely to be 
especially at risk. River deltas are mostly found in the larger Melanesian 
islands, with their well-developed river systems, and such areas are often 
densely populated. Fourth, there may also be inland river communities—
again mostly on the larger inter-plate or continental-type islands common 
to the western Pacific—the members of which may be placed at greater 
risk from flood events, especially, as is common, where villages are located 
next to waterways. Finally, some areas may become increasingly affected 
by droughts of high magnitude, such as those that are often experienced 
during El Niño events in the western part of the region, including the 
Papua New Guinea Highlands, one of the most densely populated regions 
of that country.
Adaptation includes measures that are implemented locally (in situ) to 
enable continued occupancy of a place, and a number of such measures 
could be implemented at relatively little cost and with benefits irrespective 
of climate change. These include improving public health, disaster risk 
reduction, and water supply systems; promoting coral reef and marine 
conservation; and developing measures to reduce impacts on crops. How-
ever, there may be instances in which these may be inadequate, imprac-
ticable, or too difficult to realize, and movement to locations that are 
able to provide greater security is a likely outcome. But migration need 
not always be considered as an alternative to in situ adaptation or as a 
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measure of last resort; it can also be seen as part of an integrated adapta-
tion strategy (Barnett and Webber 2010). Nevertheless, in some extreme 
circumstances it is likely to be the only option left when the life-support 
systems (land, livelihood, and/or habitat security) of a community’s terri-
tory fail. In such cases, the migration becomes forced, and the movement 
may involve whole or large portions of communities.
Island Vulnerabilities
It is important here to include a brief observation about the resilience of 
communities in Pacific Island Countries and Territories. Along with other 
Small Island Developing States (sids), picts have been identified in numer-
ous international forums and treaties as being particularly vulnerable to 
climate change. This is mostly based on notions that islands are inher-
ently vulnerable (economically and environmentally) and that sea-level 
rise in particular, together with increasing magnitude and/or frequency of 
climatic extremes, will render uninhabitable a number of locations that 
currently support populations. However, considerable evidence suggests 
that Pacific Islands people are highly resilient and not somehow inherently 
vulnerable (Bayliss-Smith and others 1988; Barnett and Campbell 2010). 
Furthermore, the effects of climate change remain uncertain. In addition 
to the uncertainty regarding what will happen to existing pict communi-
ties, the question remains of when the effects of climate change are likely 
to be manifested in ways that require some form of adaptive response. 
Moreover, people from picts are highly mobile, and migration is a key 
existing characteristic of pict societies and plays a fundamental role in 
their development (Barnett and Chamberlain 2010). Any discussion of cli-
mate change and migration must take these considerations into account.
Pacific Island Countries and Territories:  
Environmental and Demographic Futures
We tend to think of climate change and adaptation to its effects as some-
thing that will take place in the (relatively distant) future. However, it 
is probable that climate change is already occurring and that people are 
already adapting to it, including by migrating from affected areas (see, 
eg, Warner and others 2009). Nevertheless, it remains difficult to link 
most contemporary climatic and associated environmental perturbations 
to climate change, and the likelihood is that future effects will be more 
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disruptive (Parry and others 2007). Many climate-change scenarios are for 
2050 and 2100, but it is very difficult to project other environmental and 
social changes far into the future. Despite this, it is important to consider 
some of the likely implications in advance of their possible occurrence, as 
some planning, if not specific actions, may be more usefully implemented 
sooner rather than later.
While most of the discussion about climate change is future oriented, 
climate change is not the only environmental problem facing the region 
now or in the future. There are many others, some with global origins and 
others the result of local actions (though it is often difficult to untangle the 
global and the local). It is likely that these processes will interact with cli-
mate to create significant problems for future generations in picts. Current 
problems include, for example, land and coastal degradation and liquid and 
solid waste management. Most land degradation is related to deforestation 
(eg, for logging and expansion of agriculture) with implications for hydro-
logical processes (eg, increased flood magnitude, speed of onset and sedi-
mentation). Coastal degradation particularly relates to coral and mangrove 
ecosystems, which are being damaged or destroyed. These are significant 
ecosystems for protection from coastal events such as storm surges and sea-
level rise, which are projected to increase under most climate-change sce-
narios. Most picts struggle to manage waste, much of which is imported 
as packaging and a significant share of which is toxic. Indeed, some writers 
suggest that local environmental problems, which receive relatively little 
attention, are at least as important as climate change, if not more so (see, 
eg, Connell 2003). It is likely that the processes that give rise to these prob-
lems will continue well into the current century. In a number of rural areas, 
logging and increased demand for agricultural land are causing land degra-
dation—a process that will reduce community resilience if continued into 
the future. With island environments already under pressure to sustainably 
provide livelihoods for their populations, it is possible that climate-change 
effects may act as triggers to intensify the processes of degradation and in 
doing so reduce access to livelihoods in the region.
One of the factors behind the increasing significance of these problems 
is population growth, especially in urban areas where demand for fish is 
harming stocks and damaging coral reefs, demand for land is seeing man-
grove areas being reclaimed, and growing numbers of people are adding 
to solid and liquid waste flows. At the same time, informal settlements are 
burgeoning in many picts, with many structures built with limited protec-
tion against strong winds and on unstable slopes or low-lying lands. Many 
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such settlements have limited access to freshwater and other infrastruc-
ture. Such areas are liable to be highly exposed to the effects of climate 
change. 
The Secretariat of the Pacific Community has provided projections of 
Pacific Island populations through to 2050 (see table 2). What these show 
is that the region’s population may increase from an estimated 10 mil-
lion in mid-2011 to almost 18 million by 2050 (spc 2011). Most of this 
increase is on the inter-plate islands in the western Pacific, particularly 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. These countries have 
significant coastal populations, especially the latter two, while the two 
former have populated atolls as well. As already noted, the Papua New 
Guinea Highlands is already prone to severe drought events. In compari-
son, the highest projected population densities are found in all but one 
of the Micronesian countries (including Nauru and Kiribati), and three 
Polynesian countries. Among the oceanic islands, Kiribati and Nauru also 
exhibit relatively high projected population growth rates.
In an extensive overview of climate change and migration, Graeme 
Hugo identified a number of global “hot spots” where places with rap-
idly growing populations will be heavily exposed to the effects of climate 
change (2011). He included Pacific Islands among the three main groups. 
However, the scale of his analysis did not enable a more detailed evalu-
ation of population and environmental change in the region. As table 2 
shows, there is considerable variation in population growth characteristics 
and crude population densities. Accordingly, within the region there will 
be a range of “spots,” some of which may well be “hot” and potential 
sources of climate-change migrants. 
Linking Climate Change to Migration and Relocation
Considerable ambiguity exists around the terms used to refer to people 
who may migrate as a response to climate-change effects. It is important 
to distinguish climate-change migrants from the more generic categories 
of climate migrant and environmental migrant. The latter two may include 
people moving as a result of climate change, but they include many other 
categories as well. As indicated in an earlier section, a key characteristic 
of climate change–related migration is that it is in response to a long-term 
trend or set of trends, and a return to environmental conditions similar 
to those that existed prior to migration is likely to be unobtainable. It is 
also important to distinguish between climate change–forced and climate 
Table 2.  Some Indicators of pict Demographic Futures
 Region/Country Population Percent Crude 
  Estimates Population Population 
   Increase Density 
   2011–2050 (persons/km2)
 2011 2050  2011 2050
Melanesia 8,797,410 16,339,285 86 16.2 30.1
Fiji Islands 851,745 1,060,706 25 46.6 58.0
New Caledonia 252,331 343,175 36 13.6 18.5
Papua New Guinea 6,888,297 13,271,057 93 14.9 28.7
Solomon Islands 553,254 1,181,299 114 18.2 38.8
Vanuatu 251,784 483,048 92 20.5 39.3
Micronesia 546,491 720,448 32 173.2 228.3
Federated States  102,360 109,265 7 146.0 155.9 
 of Micronesia
Guam 192,090 267,820 39 355.1 495.0
Kiribati 102,697 163,266 59 126.6 201.3
Marshall Islands 54,999 61,217 11 303.9 338.2
Nauru 10,185 16,283 60 485.0 775.4
Northern Mariana 63,517 80,137 26 138.9 175.3 
 Islands
Palau 20,643 22,459 9 46.5 50.6
Polynesia 668,404 825,633 23 83.7 103.4
??????????????? ??????? ??????? ??? ?????? ?????
Cook Islands 15,576 15,977 3 65.7 67.4
French Polynesia 271,831 348,778 28 77.2 99.1
Niue 1,446 1,283 -11 5.6 5.0
?????? ???????? ???????? ??? ????? ????
Tokelau 1,162 1,148 -1 96.9 95.6
Tonga 103,682 123,008 19 159.5 189.2
Tuvalu 11,206 13,858 24 431.0 533.0
Wallis and Futuna 13,193 13,570 3 92.9 95.6
Total 10,012,305 17,885,366
??????? ??? ???????????? spc 2011;? ??????? ???????????? ??? ????? ????????? ??????? ????
????????????
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change–induced (or motivated) migrants. The former refers to those who 
have lost the land, livelihood, and/or food security of their homeland to 
such an extent that it is no longer habitable. The latter refers to those 
whose homeland has experienced effects of climate change that are partial 
or not severe (at least not yet) and who thus may have a choice between 
staying and leaving, or about who goes and who stays, with a subsequent 
reduction of “population pressure” at the point of origin and the genera-
tion of remittances at the destination that can help offset climate-change 
losses at the origin. This may be seen as “rational” climate-change adapta-
tion. It is also important to distinguish between community relocation and 
migration. The former refers to cases in which settlements must be largely 
abandoned compared to cases in which migration is based on individual 
and family decision making and may include several drivers in addition to 
climate-change effects. Figure 1 links the likely effects of climate change 
with these two sets of climate-change migrants.
How is climate change likely to affect migration? Richard Black and 
his coauthors identified five groups of drivers of migration: economic, 
political, social, demographic, and environmental (2011). Many of these 
drivers are indirect, and economic, political, social, and demographic pro-
cesses may significantly affect environmental drivers and vice versa. The 
only clearly identifiable environmental driver that might unequivocally 
link climate change to migration is the most extreme scenario, in which 
the origin becomes uninhabitable, as discussed above, and community 
relocation is required. 
It is difficult to project with much certainty how many locations will be 
unable to support their populations and when such failures might occur. 
Nevertheless, large proportions of the populations of most picts live in 
the places described above. When a location can no longer provide the 
necessities of life for its inhabitants, some kind of community relocation 
will be necessitated. Community relocation refers to “the permanent (or 
long-term) movement of a community (or a significant part of it) from one 
location to another” (Campbell and others 2007, 12). Relocation may be 
seen as a subset of migration, which often includes individual and small 
group mobility and does not necessarily require that everyone move to the 
same place. 
Relocation may be considered the most extreme form of climate migra-
tion and is considered by many to be a last-resort adaptation option 
 (Barnett and Webber 2010; Barnett and O’Neill 2012). I agree with such 
an approach but caution that communities’ moving from areas prone to 
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natural extremes is a well-used disaster risk reduction response, and it has 
been practiced throughout the Pacific region for a long time (Campbell 
and others 2007). Additionally, if communities are repeatedly subjected 
to losses from extreme events, a stoic in situ approach—staying put—may 
well be ill advised, or even immoral, if promoted by authorities (eg, by 
their not providing adaptation funding for relocation) or by the interna-
tional community, especially greenhouse gas emitters (by their not provid-
ing migration access). Furthermore, climate change presents a new set of 
circumstances for all types of migrants: what is the point of returning to 
Figure 1. Forced and induced migration in the context of climate-change 
effects on land, livelihood, and/or habitat security (after Campbell and  
Bedford 2013).
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an environment that is likely to fail to provide “life support” on an ever 
more frequent basis? 
Where Will Climate-Change Migrants Come From?
As stated above, there are several possible source areas for climate-change 
migration in addition to atolls, which are the focus of popular perceptions. 
For example, there may also be larger flows of people from inland places 
on inter-plate islands exposed to more frequent or increasingly damaging 
droughts: the Papua New Guinea Highlands alone boasts a population 
much greater than that of the rest of the Pacific combined (not includ-
ing Papua New Guinea). Nevertheless, it is also likely that many climate-
change migrants, including community relocatees, may come from atolls, 
coastal and delta settlements, and river floodplains, where land, liveli-
hood, and habitat security is degraded or destroyed. Generally speaking, 
the migrants from delta and river floodplain settlements are most likely 
to originate from Melanesia, where the large inter-plate type islands have 
well-developed hydrological systems. Because atolls have little land that 
lies significantly above sea level, it is possible that entire islands may be 
rendered uninhabitable. It is difficult to estimate the current populations 
of these different types of exposed areas, let alone project them. According 
to J C Pernetta (1990), there are 204 atolls in the Pacific Islands region, 
though not all are populated. As table 3 shows, these are found in four 
political units that consist solely of atolls as well as in at least nine other 
picts that have both populated atolls and high islands. The atoll-only 
countries may have populations of around 240,000 by mid-twenty-first 
century (40 percent greater than their current populations). It is much 
more difficult to establish projections for the atolls that are only part of 
larger countries, but if we applied the respective national growth rates to 
them (which is problematic), we might expect the populations of these 
atolls to increase from an estimated 55,000 to around 80,000 people (an 
increase of 45 percent over the next forty years or so). Combined, this 
yields a projected total atoll population for the region of around 320,000 
people. It is important, however, not to assume that all of the atoll dwell-
ers are likely to be forced to migrate: effects may differ from place to 
place, as will the implementation of in situ adaptation measures. 
While it is difficult to estimate the number of potential environmental 
migrants from non-atoll locations, it is likely that the numbers affected by 
climate change will be significant, and forced, induced, or voluntary cli-
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mate migration from these areas may be an important response to climate 
change and could involve greater numbers of people than those from the 
atolls.
Where Will Climate-Change Migrants Go?
Most studies of relocation or resettlement tend to focus on the experi-
ences of the migrants rather than those of the people who stay behind. 
An important early publication is Exiles and Migrants in Oceania (Lieber 
1977). The ten case studies presented in this volume, only one of which 
examines relocation to nearby lands, indicate that relocated communities 
often face difficulties at their destinations. This is especially so where the 
Table 3.  pict Atoll Population Estimates and Projections
 Atoll Only picts High Island Countries with Atolls
 Population Estimatesa
 2011 2050 Papua New Guinea
   Solomon Islands
Kiribatib 102,697 163,266 New Caledonia
Marshall Islands 54,999 61,217 Federated States of Micronesia
Tokelau 1,162 1,148 Palau
??????? ??????? ??????? ??????????????
   Tonga
Totals 170,064 239,489 Cook Islands
   French Polynesia
   Total Population Estimates 2009: c 55,000c
   Total Population Estimates 2050: c 80,000c
a? ????????spc 2011. 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ???? ?????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????
c? ????????Campbell 2011?
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relocation is to places with a different dominant culture from the island 
or village of origin, leading to tensions between migrant and host com-
munities (see, eg, Carroll 1977). Research on the likelihood that climate 
change may affect patterns of mobility including community relocation 
in the Pacific region is relatively recent. Most work has focused on legal 
issues, human rights, and policy considerations relating to climate change–
forced migrants (Burson 2010; McAdam 2010). From the perspective of 
those who remain behind, Jon Barnett, using Niue as an example, showed 
that while climate-induced migration may be seen as a useful adaptive 
mechanism, where populations at the origin become too small, the migra-
tion may have several negative implications for the community of origin 
(2012). 
The range of destination options available for climate-change migrants 
and relocatees depends on a number of factors, including the availability 
of destinations at their disposal. Figure 2 and table 4 show the range of 
migration possibilities for those affected by climate change. In the case 
of community relocation, there are likely to be numerous barriers and 
costs, for example, rebuilding houses and schools, even when the move is 
within customary lands. Moving across customary boundaries and farther 
beyond to crossing international borders increases the costs. Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine the complete relocation of a Pacific Island community 
to a place outside the Pacific region where new laws are likely to con-
flict with traditional lore (eg, fishing laws, building codes, and systems of 
political authority); where suitable land may be rare and/or exceedingly 
expensive; and where destination community support may be lacking. 
Many may choose, at least initially, to stay close to their customary lands 
or at least within their country (in either case if such options are possible). 
For others, however, international migration or relocation may be a more 
optimal choice and, in the cases of some atoll countries, conceivably a sole 
response option. Figure 2 indicates some of the implications of various 
forms of community relocation. A key element in Pacific Island settings is 
the role of customary land, which in most parts of the region is inalienable 
and can only “belong” to the people who “belong” to it. For relocatees, to 
be forced from one’s land is likely to be highly traumatic, but the giving up 
of land to relocatees by destination communities may be equally difficult 
(Campbell 2010a). Proximate relocation outside one’s customary land, or 
relocation to other picts, is likely to be fraught with problems over land 
tenure, which can continue for generations. Issues of land and climate 
change have been relatively neglected in the literature, as have the emo-
Table 4.  Types of Climate-Change Migration from pict Origins
 Type of Mobility
 Induced Forced 
Migration Individuals and  Communities relocate
 families migrate
Domestic/Internal
Proximate (own lands) Not likely Least disruptive
Proximate (others’ lands) Not likely Land can be problematic
Distant (rural ? rural) Not likely Land likely to be problematic
Distant (rural ? urban) Most likely Difficult to sustain community
International/External
Regional (other picts) Possible Possible to sustain community and
  lifestyle but land problematic
 International Most likely  Very unlikely to sustain community 
and lifestyle
Figure 2. Migration and relocation options for climate change induced or 
forced migrants and relocatees (after Campbell 2010b).
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tional aspects for those exposed to climate change and forced to migrate 
(see, eg, Stratford and others 2013).
????????? ?????????????????????????????????
As table 4 shows, there are four main possibilities for domestic or inter-
nal relocation: to move inland and up to nearby locations within the 
individuals’ or communities’ customary lands; to move to nearby loca-
tions that are outside the individuals’ or communities’ customary lands; 
and to move greater distances (either within one’s own island or prov-
ince or farther afield) away from the local area to lands that belong to 
other customary groups. The last option is most likely to include migra-
tion to informal settlements in urban areas, but other forms of rural-to-
rural mobility may also take place (eg, from Carteret Islands, which are 
experiencing heavy coastal erosion, in Papua New Guinea, to nearby 
Bougainville). All forms of migration have costs, but these increase with 
physical and social (particularly from a customary perspective) distance 
from the origin, and these costs are likely to be even higher when whole 
communities are required to relocate (figure 2). The least problematic 
form of relocation is to locations within one’s own customary territory, 
as in the case of the community on the Biausevu River, inland from the 
Coral Coast on Viti Levu, which is prone to flash flooding during tropi-
cal cyclones and heavy rainfall events. This community moved four times 
over one hundred years before moving upward to a site on a nearby hill-
top (Campbell and others 2007). All of the moves were within customary 
lands. Now, however, there is no longer available space on the hilltop, 
and new houses are being built once again near the river. As noted above, 
relocating to land belonging to a different kinship group (whether within 
one’s own country or even in another pict) is often fraught with long-
standing tensions (Campbell 2010a). For example, Bedford outlined 
the tensions between mataqali (clans) from two villages on the island 
of Kabara in eastern Fiji that were intensified by the government-initi-
ated relocation of a village following a destructive cyclone four decades 
earlier in 1936 (Bedford 1976). Despite several attempts over decades, 
Carteret Island people are still struggling to find sufficient land to resettle 
in Bougainville (Campbell 2010a). From a practical perspective, Vinau 
Cagilaba compared two Fijian villages that had been inundated by sev-
eral storm surge events (2005). One of the villages remained on site and 
raised money to build a seawall, while the other moved upslope and 
away from the coast. Both communities found disadvantages as a result 
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of their choices: the one that built the seawall had to constantly raise 
funds and work to maintain their coastal protection, and the upslope 
people, particularly the women, found the task of carrying water uphill 
onerous. Both responses were seen as permanent; as one villager put it, 
it was “a life sentence.” 
?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
Table 5 shows possible international forms of climate-change migration. 
Where international migration pathways are available, many climate-
change migrants may choose such an option. The closest options are island 
states within the region. There are three precedents: from Banaba (in the 
Gilbert Islands) to Rabi (in Fiji) (Silverman 1971, 1977; Teaiwa 2005); 
from Vaitupu (in the Ellis Islands) to Kioa (in Fiji) (Koch 1978); and from 
the Gilbert Islands to Western Province (in Solomon Islands) (Knudson 
1977). However, it is informative to recall that all three examples (none 
of which was without problems, including the issue of land) took place 
during the colonial era and were basically enabled (or encouraged) by the 
British colonial system in the form of the Fiji and Western Pacific high 
commissions (Campbell 2010a). However, from a contemporary perspec-
Table 5.  The Range of Possible Destinations for pict Climate-Change 
Migrants and Relocatees
Possible groups of destination countries  Countries included
for climate change forced or induced  in destination groups
international relocation or migration 
Other picts  All picts with secure land (environmental, 
cultural)
Current colonial countries and  France, New Zealand, United States 
administrations
Freely associated countries New Zealand, United States
Previous colonial countries and  Australia, France, New Zealand,  
administrations (at time  United Kingdom, United States 
of independence)
Pacific Rim countries  East Asian, North American, Central 
(not included above) American, and South American countries
Any other takers The rest of the world?
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tive it is doubtful that existing Pacific Island sovereign states will enable 
such easy entry and settlement. 
Looking farther afield, there are no examples of community relocation 
to countries outside of the Pacific region, although the New Zealand gov-
ernment began a resettlement scheme, including assisted migration, for 
people from Tokelau, which it considered to be overpopulated and which 
in 1966 suffered the effects of a major tropical cyclone (Huntsman and 
Hooper 1973; Wessen and others 1992). By the time of the 2006 census 
in New Zealand, there were almost five times as many Tokelauans living 
in New Zealand as in Tokelau itself. As with Tokelauans, a number of 
Table 6.  picts with International Migration Access
pict of Origin Country of Destinationa
??????????????? ?????????????
Federated States of Micronesia
Guam
Marshall Islands
Northern Mariana Islands
Palau
Cook Islands New Zealandb
Niue
?????
Tokelau
French Polynesia France
New Caledonia
Wallis and Futuna
a? ????????? ??????????????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ?????? ???????????? ????? pict??
?????????????????1?
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????75??????????250???
????????????75??????????????????????????????????????????????????8,000 tempo-
??????????????????? ???????????? ???????? ?????????????????????????????? ???????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????2012??
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migrants from several PICTs have access to France, New Zealand, and the 
United States through existing colonial linkages or because their country is 
self-governing in free association with one of these metropolitan countries. 
These are shown in table 6. For example, Tokelau, Niue, and the Cook 
Islands are linked to New Zealand through their territorial or free associa-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
New Zealand. Similarly, the French territories are considered to be parts 
of France, and migration between French territories in the Pacific may also 
be affected by climate change, most likely with increased flows to New 
Caledonia. Some may also migrate farther to France itself. Likewise, the 
Micronesian countries and territories (with the exception of Kiribati and 
Nauru) have access to the United States, although there have been recent 
calls to place restrictions on some of these flows. 
However, as table 7 indicates, there is a group of countries with very 
limited opportunities for international migration access. The table also 
shows that most of these countries have high levels of exposure to cli-
mate-change effects and either high rates of population growth rates or 
high crude population densities, or both. This group of countries includes 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, all on inter-plate 
islands (which are also characterized by high population growth rates, 
river floodplains and deltas in particular, and coastal settlements and 
drought-prone places); the two atoll states of Tuvalu and Kiribati (which 
have very high population densities and are exposed to loss of land, liveli-
hood, and habitat security); and the raised atoll Nauru (also with a high 
population density and limited livelihood options). They may well fall, in 
the future, into the group of countries with the greatest need for induced 
and forced international migration options but with the fewest choices. 
A major issue for increased international migration as a climate-change 
adaptation, therefore, is likely to be one of migration access. 
Conclusions
This paper has canvassed some of the key issues relating to climate change 
and migration in picts. It has identified two main categories of climate-
change mobility. The first, climate change–induced migration, is difficult 
to distinguish from existing migration patterns, and the climate-change 
motivations or drivers of migration decision making are similarly difficult 
to distinguish from other economic, social, political, demographic, and 
other environmental influences (which are closely interrelated). Neverthe-
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less, climate-change effects may cause reductions in the land, livelihood, 
and habitat security of Pacific Island communities, which makes sustained 
occupation by all members marginal. From this perspective, reducing num-
bers and supplementing the declining island life-support system through 
remittances is an appropriate adaptation option.
The second form of climate-change mobility is forced relocation, in 
which the land, livelihood, and habitat security have been so compro-
mised by climate-change effects that sustained habitation is rendered 
impossible. Community relocation following repeated natural extreme 
events is not rare in the region and is likely to become a necessity for 
some communities faced with climate change, although it is difficult to 
identify just when such need will arise. Nevertheless, it seems illogical 
to expect village communities to endure increases in drought and flood 
frequencies and magnitudes and tropical cyclones of increasing intensity 
and to continue to rebuild houses and other buildings and rehabilitate 
agriculture and water supply systems until it is affirmed that their land 
is definitely no longer suitable for habitation. More appropriate will be 
a proactive approach to migration and relocation that will enable com-
munities and their individual members to be well prepared if voluntary 
migration or forced relocation is necessary. This may entail considerable 
dialogue between governments as well as between local communities at 
the places of origin and destination. 
At the beginning of this article, I observed that picts contribute very 
little to the climate-change problem but are among those most likely to be 
adversely affected. From this perspective, it would seem appropriate that 
they should be compensated by greenhouse gas emitters, especially those 
who do not reduce their emissions, for the costs they incur in their efforts 
to adapt to changes they have not caused. As migration is an adaptation 
option, the costs of migration (and community relocation in particular) 
should be covered by such bodies as the Adaptation Fund Board. Such 
costs may include contribution to airfares, the purchase of land for reset-
tlement schemes, and the building or purchase of homes.
As this article shows, some of the greatest demand for migration 
responses to climate change may come from countries without full access 
to Pacific Rim or former colonial countries. In addition, flows along exist-
ing migration pathways may increase. Signatories to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change are committed to help-
ing those communities most at risk from the effects of climate change. 
It would seem, however, that enabling adaptation to climate change by 
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allowing or facilitating increased mobility is likely to be a major challenge 
for the international community.
* * *
I would like to thank ??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ???????????????????????????
??????????????????????
Notes
1 The report of Working Group I of the ipcc’s fifth assessment has been 
released (ipcc 2013). This report indicates greater certainty among physical sci-
entists of the existence of anthropogenic climate change. The Working Group II 
report, which includes a chapter on small islands, is scheduled for release in the 
first half of 2014.
2 These terms have become dominant in the context of climate change. Miti-
gation causes confusion in the area of disaster risk reduction, which is becoming 
increasingly connected to adaptation. Adaptation, drawn from biology, may be 
seen as problematic from a social science perspective because it seems to suggest 
that humans have little agency. However, the contemporary literature on such 
topics as community-based adaptation focuses on empowering communities, 
rather than representing them as passively being forced to adapt or adjust.
3 The ipcc ar4 Working Group II (Parry and others 2007) defines adapta-
tion as follows: adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual 
or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits 
beneficial opportunities. 
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Abstract
Despite considerable debate about whether or not climate change will cause large 
numbers of people to migrate, there has been little consideration of how such 
displacement might be caused. Three effects of climate change are identified as 
possible drivers of migration: loss of or reduction in land security, livelihood secu-
rity, and habitat security. Where these are destroyed by climate change, migration 
will be forced and would require the abandonment of some locations. Such com-
munity relocation is likely to be a disruptive form of climate-change migration, 
and past experience indicates that there are numerous social, cultural, emotional, 
and economic costs associated with such moves, even at relatively small distances. 
Where the loss of security is partial, voluntary or induced migration may be a 
practical adaptive response, reducing pressure on declining local life-support sys-
tems and providing remittances to supplement declining livelihoods. Most atten-
tion has been focused on atoll communities, but most Pacific communities (with 
the exception of Papua New Guinea) are coastal, and the security of some inland 
areas may be threatened by increasing magnitude and frequency of droughts. 
Destinations for climate-change migrants may range from locations within cus-
tomary lands to foreign countries within and beyond the region. A key issue is the 
essential link between Pacific Islands people and their land, which poses major 
problems not only for those forced to leave but also for communities within the 
region that may be required to give up land for relocatees.
keywords: climate change, migration, relocation, land security, livelihood secu-
rity, habitat security
